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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented by the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is whether the petitioners have demonstrated any special 
and important reasons that would justify review of the Court of 
Appeals7 decision. As demonstrated herein, there are no such 
special and important reasons. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court: 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only when there are special 
and important reasons therefor. The following, 
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring 
the court's discretion, indicate the character 
of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or federal law 
in a way that is in conflict with a decision of 
this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of 
supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided 
an important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioners have requested a Writ of Certiorari from the 
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the dismissal of 
petitioners' claims for equitable relief. The sole issue presented 
to this Court is whether petitioners' brief raises the appropriate 
considerations governing review of certiorari by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts 
In February of 1987, a complaint was filed by Petitioners 
challenging the validity of a combination of four dairy coopera-
tives which took place between 1984 and 1986. The complaint sought 
rescission and damages on behalf of a purported class (R. 1-26). 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, asserting that no dispute of material facts existed (R. 
52) , and asking for judgment as a matter of law (R. 49) . Plain-
tiffs also requested that they be certified as representatives of a 
proposed class, under Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 
8). 
Defendants/Respondents filed countering motions for 
summary judgment (R. 177, 224), as well as a motion to dismiss (R. 
91) . The parties all filed memoranda in support of their motions 
and in opposition to the opposing parties7 motions (R. 94, 107, 
117, 154, 184, 196, 247, 268, 469, 514, 525). 
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A consolidated statement of undisputed facts was exchang-
ed between the parties, resulting in agreement on many material 
facts (R. 140-153). Affidavits and deposition testimony were also 
submitted to the trial court, and made part of the record (R. 166-
176, Addendum No. 5; R. 180-183, Addendum No. 6; R. 239-242; R. 
243-246; R. 482-513, Addendum No. 8; R. 529-547, 548-551; Addendum 
No. 7 and 4). 
The district court heard the pending motions on June 8, 
1987, and issued a memorandum decision on June 29, 1987 (R. 552-
554). On July 23, 1987, the district court executed an order in 
accordance with its memorandum decision (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 
3). By its order, the court denied plaintiffs7 request for class 
certification. It also dismissed plaintiffs7 claims for rescission 
on two alternate grounds. As its first ground for dismissal of the 
rescission claim, the district court noted that "there are many 
other entities, people involved, that have so changed their 
position in reliance upon the transfer of assets that it would be 
inequitable for the court to consider the remedies of recession 
[sic] and restitution." (R. 587). The court's second ground for 
dismissal was apparently based on the applicability of Utah Code 
Ann., Sec. 3-1-30, et seq. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's findings on the applicability of laches, and did not 
address the second ground of dismissal. 
The district court also observed that, because the 
petitioners had made no individual claims for damages, its rulings 
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on class certification and rescission required dismissal of the 
claims of the complaint as they were pled. However, the trial 
court also ruled that its ruling was without prejudice to any 
claims which the plaintiffs individually might have for damages. 
The court made clear that its ruling would not preclude such 
claims, and expressly granted leave for plaintiffs to amend their 
complaint to include them (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3). 
The court expressly made no ruling as to whether the 
transfer of assets from CVDA to IMPA was wrongful, and specifically 
reserved such factual determination, as well as related factual 
determinations, for future proceedings after the anticipated amend-
ment of the plaintiffs' complaint (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3). 
Even though they had been granted leave to do so, plain-
tiffs elected not to amend their complaint and proceed with their 
own claims for damages, but chose instead to pursue this appeal (R. 
591-592). 
Statement of Facts 
Petitioners are all members and directors of Cache Valley 
Dairy Association ("CVDA"), a respondent in the captioned appeal. 
CVDA is an agricultural cooperative in the business of promoting 
and facilitating production, distribution and sale of members' 
dairy products. (R. 141, 167; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
On June 27, 1984, the directors of CVDA entered into a 
Letter of Intent to create the Intermountain Milk Producers 
Association ("IMPA") by transferring assets and liabilities from 
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CVDA and other existing cooperatives to IMPA. (R. 170, 530, 536-
542; Addendum No. 9, 5, and 7). On November 27, 1985, approximate-
ly 18 months after the directors had voiced their intent to combine 
the cooperatives, they voted to seek approval for the combination 
from the members of CVDA. (R. 144, 180-182, 529-547; Addendum No. 
9, 5 and 7). On December 16, 1985, each present member of CVDA, 
including the appellants, received notice of the special meeting of 
members to approve the combination of CVDA with the other coopera-
tives. Members voted 103 to 43 in favor of combining the coopera-
tives and creating the IMPA. (R. 429-547; Addendum No. 7). 
Legal documents transferring assets and liabilities of 
CVDA to IMPA were signed by Gordon Zilles, one of the appellants, 
in February 1986. The combination of cooperatives and creation of 
IMPA was complete on August 1, 1986. (R. 144-145, 170, 529-547; 
Addendum 9, 5 and 7). Petitioners filed their verified complaint 
in the captioned matter more than six months later seeking rescis-
sion of the combination and damages. (R. 1-2 6) . 
As the Court of Appeals determined, the record conclu-
sively shows that during the six months between the time IMPA was 
established and when this lawsuit was initiated, CVDA, IMPA, the 
other dairy cooperatives which combined with CVDA, the members of 
all combining cooperatives, and members, creditors, customers and 
employees of IMPA had all relied and changed their positions upon 
the combination of the cooperatives. (Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 
13) . The undisputed facts in the record demonstrating reliance on 
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the formation of IMPA included: (1) IMPA's construction of a $10 
million milk plant in Salt Lake County (R. 148-149, 173); (2) the 
sale of certain dairy plants, and the removal of dairy equipment 
from plants which was later sold off or placed in other plants at 
considerable expense (R. 150, 175) ; (3) the reduction of milk 
production in IMPA's operating area, which affected every cheese 
and surplus milk plant in the area (R. 147-148; Addendum No. 9) ; 
and (4) the issuance of a credit line from Sacramento Bank for 
Cooperatives with the assets of all former cooperatives being 
pledged by IMPA as security for loans (R. 14 6, 171; Addendum No. 9 
and 5). 
The trial court applied the doctrine of laches to dismiss 
plaintiffs7 first, second and fifth causes of action. (Appendix, 
Part B, Memorandum Decision at 2) . In upholding the trial court's 
decision, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's 
finding that appellants had unreasonably delayed filing their com-
plaint, and that their unreasonable delay resulted in prejudice to 
the defendants. (Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 12-13). 
The Court of Appeals' holding that appellants had un-
reasonably delayed filing suit was based in part on the personal 
involvement of the directors of CVDA with the combination process. 
The court noted that appellants unquestionably had notice of the 
proposed formation of IMPA, and that their decision to wait until 
six months after IMPA was created to file suit was unreasonable. 
(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 12-13). The Court of Appeals 
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examined the actions of CVDA, IMPA and numerous third parties 
(discussed in detail above) in determining that respondents were 
prejudiced by the appellants7 delay in seeking an available remedy. 
(Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 13). 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
EXISTENCE OF ANY SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS 
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE EXTRAORDINARY GRANT OF 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (which was 
added effective April 20, 1987), provides that review by a Writ of 
Certiorari "is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only when there are special and important 
reasons therefor," (Emphasis added). Because this Court has not 
yet elaborated on the considerations set forth in Rule 43, it is 
useful to review decisions interpreting the comparable federal 
provisions. Shortly after passage of the federal statutory writ of 
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court established the 
foundations of the certiorari doctrine: 
While this power is coextensive with all possi-
ble necessities and sufficient to secure to 
this court a final control over the litigation 
in all the Courts of Appeal, it is a power 
which will be sparingly exercised, and only 
when the circumstances of the case satisfy us 
that the importance of the question involved, 
the necessity of avoiding conflict between two 
or more courts of appeal, or between courts of 
appeal and the courts of a state, or some 
matter affecting the interests of this nation 
in its internal or external relations, demands 
such exercise. 
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Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 515 (1897) (emphasis added). The 
limited exercise of discretion described by the United States 
Supreme Court serves important public and institutional policies 
which are just as applicable to the Utah Supreme Court. Liberal 
grant of certiorari review would undermine the finality and 
reliability of decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals. 
Moreover, broad review would defeat the institutional policy of 
easing the burden on the Supreme Court. As noted by Professors 
Wright & Miller in the federal context: 
In most circumstances, the Supreme Court exer-
cises its discretion on the assumption that it 
cannot function as an ordinary appellate court 
concerned with achieving individual justice in 
individual cases. . . . As the number of cases 
seeking review has grown, the docket has had to 
be devoted more and more to constitutional and 
statutory questions that are likely to have 
widespread general impact. 
16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4004, at 507-08 (1977). 
The only ground upon which petitioners rely in seeking 
review by Writ of Certiorari apparently is based on Rule 43(4). 
Petitioners assert that 
[a]s the record now sits it is unclear whether 
agricultural cooperative associations are 
required to comply with Sections 3-1-30 et seq. 
Even in this very case there has been no ruling 
on that central issue yet the case is being 
remanded for further proceedings. The large 
number of agricultural cooperatives and their 
members are left in a state of confusion. 
Indeed if Sections 3-1-30 et seq. can be 
disregarded, can other Sections of Title 3 be 
disregarded as well. This is an important 
question of state law "which has not been, but 
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should be, settled by this Court." Rule 43 R. 
Utah S.Ct. 
(Petition at 15) . 
Petitioners' reliance on Rule 43 appears to be misplaced. 
Rule 43(4) indicates that review may be appropriate "[w]hen the Court 
of Appeals has decided an important question of municipal, state, 
or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
court." In its decision, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary 
to address the issue of whether, and to what extent, the statutory 
merger provisions were applicable. Indeed, the court assumed for 
purposes of its opinion that the statutory provisions applied and 
had not been followed. The court did not "decide an important 
question" concerning the applicability of the statute, but instead 
concluded that resolution of the case was properly based on the 
application of the laches doctrine. Rule 43(4), which hinges on a 
decision by the Court of Appeals concerning state law, is thus 
irrelevant under the facts of this action. 
Petitioners' argument appears to be that this Court should 
decide issues of statutory construction which are irrelevant to the 
Court of Appeals' holding. In essence, therefore, petitioners are 
seeking an advisory opinion. This Court and the Court of Appeals 
have established a "longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid 
advisory opinions . . . " Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 
32, 33 (App. 1990). The circumstances of this case do not warrant 
deviation from that well-established rule. 
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Having established that subpart (4) of Rule 43 is inap-
plicable herein, respondents will quickly address the remaining 
three subparts of the rule. Subparts (1) and (2) are both plainly 
inapplicable by their express terms. The Court of Appeals' decision 
was neither in conflict with a decision of another panel of the 
Court of Appeals, nor in conflict with a decisions of this Court. 
Subpart (3) provides for issuance of writs of certiorari 
when the Court of Appeals has totally departed, or sanctioned a 
departure, from "the usual course of judicial proceedings." Such a 
departure has not been demonstrated. As set forth in the Statement 
of Facts portion of this brief, supra, the trial court found, and 
the Court of Appeals confirmed, that the doctrine of laches was 
properly applied to dismiss the first, second and fifth causes of 
action in the complaint because petitioners had waited an unreason-
able length of time to initiate legal proceedings, which prejudiced 
the defendants. The holdings of both courts were based on undis-
puted facts. 
In light of the trial court's determinations and appli-
cable law, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals was fully 
justified in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the peti-
tioners' claims seeking equitable relief. It could hardly have 
held otherwise. No departure from the usual course of judicial 
proceedings was involved. Since the grounds for granting a writ of 
certiorari have not been shown, this court should deny Brice's 
Petition. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATELY RULED ON THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the positions 
asserted in petitioners' two separate arguments appear inconsistent 
on their face. In a portion of appellants' brief entitled "First 
Question Presented," appellants seem to concede that the doctrine 
of laches was properly applied to dismiss their claims for equitable 
relief: 
[The trial judge] expressly found that the 
plaintiffs could amend their complaint to seek 
damages. The trial judge erred because plain-
tiffs were seeking money damages but his 
reasoning about laches is sound. Certainly a 
court of equity can restrict forms of relief 
because of the presence of laches. 
(Petition, p. 15, emphasis added). Although petitioners appear to 
concede in the first portion of their argument that laches properly 
precluded their claims for equitable relief, they go on to dispute 
the proper application of laches in the subsequent section of their 
brief under the heading "Second Question Presented." Respondents 
will address appellants' specific arguments more fully below. 
However, respondents desire to impress upon the court the bald 
contradiction of appellants' arguments. Respondents contend that 
the contradictions and confusion inherent in appellants' position 
is itself strong justification for a summary denial of the requested 
writ. 
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A. The Arguments Asserted in Support of Petitioners' "First 
Question Presented" are Irrelevant, 
Petitioners styled the "First Question Presented" in 
their brief as whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the 
rights of the participants in merging agricultural cooperatives. 
As set forth previously, the Court of Appeals assumed the applica-
bility of Utah Code Ann. sec. 3-1-30 et seq. , and that respondents 
had not complied with the statutory provisions. However, the Court 
of Appeals went on to hold that petitioners' claims for equitable 
relief were barred by their unreasonable delay in seeking a remedy, 
and by the prejudice that would result to respondents and others by 
a rescission of the IMPA combination. Consequently, petitioner's 
first argument is irrelevant. 
It should also be noted that in the portion of their 
brief relating to the "First Question Presented" the petitioners 
discuss at length their claims for damages. Petitioners' argument 
concerning their damage claims is puzzling in light of the Court of 
Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's dismissal of those 
claims. The fact that the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal 
and remanded is further evidence of the irrelevance of the arguments 
asserted in support of the petitioners' "First Question Presented." 
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B. The Court of Appeals Properly Held that Petitioners' Claims 
for Equitable Relief Were Barred by the Doctrine of Laches, 
Petitioners7 "Second Question Presented" is simply that 
the Court of Appeals improperly applied the doctrine of laches to 
bar their claims for equitable relief. However, it is plain from 
the court's opinion that the applicability of laches was carefully 
considered. As the Court noted, "laches is appropriately applied 
where there is (1) unreasonable delay by a plaintiff in seeking an 
available remedy, and (2) prejudice to the defendant resulting from 
that delay." (Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 12.) Therefore, the 
applicability of laches necessarily depends on the facts of each 
case. In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties 
did not agree on all facts set forth in the statements-of-fact 
exchanged by parties. (Appendix, Part A, Opinion at 8). However, 
the court held that the facts which were stipulated justified the 
trial court's conclusion that laches barred petitioners7 claims for 
equitable relief. (Appendix A, Part A, Opinion at 8, 13). 
The Court of Appeals held that, under the undisputed 
facts, petitioners7 delay in challenging the validity of the 
combination was unreasonable. The court further held that the 
delay had caused substantial prejudice to respondents. (Opinion at 
13, Appendix A.) The resolution of the laches issue was simply an 
application of that doctrine to undisputed facts and does not 
present an issue for review. 
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III. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD ALSO BE 
DENIED ON THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY. 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, makes clear 
that this Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a 
petition for Writ of Certiorari for the review of a Court of 
Appeals decision. In this case, the interests of judicial economy 
further compel the Court to exercise its discretion to deny the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
This dispute has been decided after careful and time-
consuming consideration by the Court of Appeals. The resources and 
time of both the judicial system and the litigants will be spared 
by this Court's refusal to grant the Writ of Certiorari. The Court 
of Appeals was created primarily to relieve this Court of a portion 
of its burden. Having assigned this case to the Court of Appeals 
for disposition in full accord with the above stated purpose, it 
would be counterproductive for this Court to re-examine the same 
issues. The legal issues involved are not novel or of widespread 
import, and do not warrant review by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
No special and important reasons exist in this case for 
this Court to grant a petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals was correct, and does not conflict 
in any way with prior decisions of this court or with decisions 
from another panel of the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the case 
does not involve any issues of widespread and significant importance 
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that would justify the expenditure of this Court's limited resources. 
Rather, the case concerns the application of the equitable doctrine 
of laches to undisputed facts that are unique to this case. Any 
further review would only serve to undermine the importance of the 
Court of Appeals and the finality of its decision. For the foregoing 
reasons, respondents respectfully submit that the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari must be denied. 
DATED this tT^ day of April, 1990. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By 
Roger P. ffhristensen 
Karra J. Porter 
Mark L. Anderson 
Attorneys for Respondent IMPA 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C, 
By 
J. Anthony Eyre 
Attorneys for Respondent Directors 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
R. Brent Stephens 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Rand Wilson 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES 
By 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorneys for Respondent CVDA 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Brice et al, v. Cache Valley Dairy Association et al., 
Case No, 890289-CA, December 11, 1989 (Not for Publication 
Appendix B: Brice v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, Civil No, 
25514, Memorandum Decision, June 27, 1987. R, 552-554 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of April, 1990, 
4 true and correct copies of RESPONDENTS7 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
N. George Daines 
Kevin E. Kane 
BARRETT & DAINES 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Bullock.1 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellants, who were members and directors of Cache Valley 
Dairy Association (CVDA), an agricultural cooperative, appeal 
from a summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all their 
claims. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
CVDA is a nonprofit corporation first organized in 1935. 
Its principal business was to promote and facilitate 
production, distribution, and sale of members' dairy products 
and by-products. To accomplish its purposes, CVDA's articles 
of incorporation provided that it could "acquire, own, operate, 
mortgage, control, hypothecate, sell and transfer any and all 
kinds of real and personal property necessary to be used in the 
carrying on of said business.H The association acted as agent 
for its members in handling and dealing with their dairy 
products. This agency relationship was created by the 
execution of a marketing agreement between CVDA and each member 
as an active milk producer. To become a member, a milk 
producer had to sign an "Association Marketing Contract." 
Termination of any producer's marketing contract terminated 
membership. When a member ceased to be an active milk 
producer, his eligibility for membership in CVDA ended. 
Like other dairy cooperatives, CVDA raised working capital 
by retaining part of the proceeds left from the sale of 
members' milk products after payment of expenses. This process 
created equity interests, called "producer equities," in 
members of the cooperative based on each member's share of the 
capital contribution. When a producer became inactive, 
membership in CVDA ceased, but he retained his equity 
interests. Producer equities were retired by CVDA on a 
ten-year rotation cycle as working capital was replenished from 
current revenues from the sale of active members' milk products. 
CVDA's Board of Directors consisted of twenty-one elected 
members. According to the complaint, the six individual 
appellants were duly qualified and acting members of 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Seniot District Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
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the CVDA Board of Directors, as well as producer members and 
holders of producer equities worth more than $50, at all 
material times. The CVDA Board took the following action on 
June 27, 1984, with all board members present: 
Manager Rick handed out to the Board a 
letter of intent that would give the 
management the go ahead to put together 
the [Intermountain Milk Producers 
Association]. It was necessary to have 
Board approval for the President to sign 
the letter of intent. Lynn Mieckle made a 
motion that we accept the letter of intent 
with Rulon King seconding and motion 
carried. 
Elections of the Directors to represent 
Cache Valley Dairy Association as 
Directors of the new IMPA Board are Frank 
Olsen, Larry Pitcher, LaThair Peterson, 
Vernon Bankhead, Lynn Mieckle, Douglas 
Quayle and Wilford Meek, with William 
Lindley being appointed Vice-chairman of 
the committee. 
The letter of intent approved by the CVDA Board was signed by 
its President, William Lindley, following that Board meeting. 
The document recites that the four parties (CVDA, Western 
General Dairies, Inc., Star Valley Producers, Inc., and Lake 
Mead Cooperative Association), "after considerable discussion 
and negotiations," determined to form a marketing agency to be 
called Intermountain Milk Producers Association (IMPA), a Utah 
agricultural cooperative. The IMPA Board was to consist of 
eighteen directors, including those elected by and from the 
CVDA Board. The letter of intent provided for the immediate 
formation of IMPA and commencement of its management operations 
by August 1, 1984, with the ultimate goal of consolidating all 
operations into IMPA. The letter of intent described how the 
four parties would implement their plan and achieve their 
objective, then stated in Paragraph 19: 
At the time the consolidation is 
accomplished, all members of the parties 
will terminate their membership in the 
parties and will be given membership in 
IMPA. All remaining assets of the Parties 
will be transferred to IMPA at book value 
and all remaining debts will be assumed by 
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IMPA. All employees will be transferred 
to IMPA, subject to any labor contracts 
which may then exist* Producer equities 
held by the Parties will be assumed by 
IMPA and will be rotated on a uniform 
basis* 
The CVDA Board met on November 27, 1985, with only one member, 
respondent Robert Jackson, absent. The minutes compiled by 
appellant Gordon Zilles, as secretary, show the following 
action taken: -A meeting to merge the coop [sic] together was 
discussed. On a motion by the Board, they voted 20 for and 1 
voted against. Meeting adjourned.-
Pursuant to this authorization, the CVDA Board mailed 
notice of a special meeting of members to be held December 16, 
1985. According to the notice, the principal purpose of the 
meeting was to "consider and vote upon the Plan of Merger 
(Consolidation)" of the four cooperatives. Passage of the plan 
was said to require only a simple majority of the members 
present and voting at the special meeting. The notice was sent 
to active producer members only, not to those who were inactive 
producers holding equity certificates. 
The -Summary of Plan of Merger (Consolidation)-
accompanying the notice stated that the four co-ops -propose to 
consolidate their assets into IMPA.- The main paragraph of the 
plan summary stated: 
The terms and conditions are: 1) the 
Consolidating Cooperatives will transfer 
to IMPA all of their assets at book value 
in exchange for the promise by IMPA to 
assume all liabilities of said 
cooperatives; b) All membership agreements 
held by said cooperatives shall be 
assigned to and assumed by IMPA in 
accordance with their terms; c) all milk 
base held by members shall become milk 
base of IMPA on a pound-for-pound basis 
subject to the same rules, regulations and 
agreements in effect on the day the plan 
is adopted; d) all equities of IMPA held 
by members of said cooperatives shall 
become equities of IMPA on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis subject to 
existing rules, regulations and 
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agreements; f) all agreements, contracts, 
claims and obligations whatsoever of said 
cooperatives shall be assumed by IMPA as 
though originally held by IMPA; g) All 
employees employed by said cooperatives as 
of the date of approval of the plan shall 
become employees of IMPA and all 
retirement plans, vacation accruals or 
other employee benefits shall be assumed 
by IMPA; and h) all other provisions of 
the Agreement of Merger (Consolidation). 
Paragraph 6 of the plan summary provided that the officers of 
the consolidating cooperatives were to execute the documents 
necessary to carry out the plan. 
The provisions for merger of agricultural cooperatives set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 3-1-30 to -41 (1988), a part of the 
U]iiform"Agriculfcural--OaQp.exJLtj-ve Association Act added in 1965, 
(^axB-aflmittedly not followed^ Among other things, the statute 
mandates proxy voting at the special membership meeting to 
approve a plan of merger. Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-34 (1988). It 
also grants membership status, for purposes of notice and 
voting on a plan of merger and dissenting rights, to holders of 
"certificates of interest, patronage refund certificates or 
other interest by whatever name designated* exceeding $50 in 
value, even if those holders are not otherwise designated as 
members by the cooperative's articles of incorporation. Utah 
Code Ann. § 3-1-33 (1988). 
Of the 146 CVDA members present at the special meeting held 
on December 16, 1985, 103 voted in favor of a plan to combine 
their cooperative with the others. Each member was allowed to 
cast one vote, and no proxy voting was permitted. Nonmembers 
holding producer equities were neither notified of the special 
meeting nor allowed to vote. 
Thereafter, the respective CVDA and IMPA Boards and 
officers completed their combination on the terms and 
conditions above. The assets of CVDA were transferred to IMPA 
in February 1986. The transfer documents were signed by two 
officers of CVDA, respondent William Lindley as President and 
appellant Gordon Zilles as Secretary. The combination of the 
four cooperatives pursuant to the letter of intent was complete 
by August 1986. Each of the four cooperatives had transferred 
all their assets to IMPA, and IMPA had assumed all of their 
liabilities. In March 1986, IMPA had redeemed $1,173,989 of 
4 
AQn9QO_r ,& 
CVDA producer equities, reducing outstanding CVDA producer 
equities by twenty percent and placing the unredeemed producer 
equities on the same repayment rotation schedule as that used 
in the other three combined cooperatives. IMPA had used the 
assets received from the four combined cooperatives as 
collateral to establish an $18,000,000 line of credit with the 
Sacramento Bank for Cooperatives. Consolidated financial 
statements and joint tax returns were filed for the fiscal 
years ending July 31, 1985, and July 31, 1986. Approximately 
eighty-two IMPA producers, who had been active members of CVDA 
until the cooperatives combined operations, converted from 
Grade B milk base status to Grade A, and they were consequently 
receiving payments for their milk at a higher rate. Each 
member of IMPA, including those from CVDA, who converted milk 
base from Grade B to Grade A had expended funds to upgrade 
their facilities in order to qualify. Numerous other 
significant changes in operations had occurred, including 
changes in the system for collection and transport of milk, 
reassignment of employees, insurance and workers* compensation 
coverage changes, capital purchases, construction of new 
facilities, and termination of CVDA profit-sharing and pension 
plans. 
Some time after August 1986, several directors of CVDA 
expressed concern about the manner and method in which the 
combination of CVDA into IMPA had been carried out. Seventeen 
CVDA Board members and various attorneys met on December 17, 
1986, to discuss what had happened. The following action, 
which appears in appellant Zilles's minutes, concluded that 
Board meeting: 
After everyone had left, except Board 
members, Lynn Mieckle made a motion that 
we have IMPA indemnify our action as Board 
members of Cache Valley Dairy 
Association. That after this is done, we 
go home and milk cows. LaThair Peterson 
seconded. A vote was taken with 12 for 
and 4 against. Gene Brice refrained from 
voting. Those voting against were Rolfe 
Tuddenham, Willis Hall, Joe May and 
Douglas Quayle. Meeting adjourned. 
The record does not indicate any follow-up action on the 
indemnification motion. 
The appellants filed this lawsuit two months later, on 
February 18, 1987, alleging five causes of action. In the 
first, labeled -illegal merger," appellants claimed that CVDA 
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and IMPA failed to follow legal procedures for merger; 
therefore, the purported merger was null and void. The 
substance of the allegations is that the two agricultural 
cooperatives merged without affording specific notice, voting, 
and dissenting rights mandated by the merger provisions in the 
Agricultural Cooperative Associations Statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 3-1-30 to -41. The relief sought in this claim was 
rescission of the merger itself and all transactions by which 
it had been accomplished, by return of CVDA's assets to it or 
payment by defendants of -damages- in excess of $55,000,000, 
the amount by which CVDA's assets had allegedly been "diluted 
and dissipated- as a result of the illegal merger and 
subsequent activities.2 
The second cause of action, labeled "Shareholders' 
Derivative Action," added allegations to support appellants' 
request for certification of the suit as a shareholders' 
derivative action pursuant to Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Appellants alleged facts about the CVDA 
Board's unwillingness to assert CVDA'a unspecified "rights" to 
"protect its property and business" against IMPA and the 
defendant CVDA Board members. The third cause of action, 
captioned "Negligence," was directed at the activities of 
counsel who advised the two co-ops and supervised the 
transactions by which they combined. The claim, brought by 
appellants as directors and as class representatives and on 
behalf of CVDA, alleged that attorney Randon Wilson failed to 
exercise due diligence and care and violated his "duty of 
trust, loyalty and confidentiality to CVDA and its Directors 
and Officers." The fourth cause of action, also brought by 
appellants as directors and class representatives and on behalf 
of CVDA, was labeled "Directors' Negligence." Appellants 
alleged that the other CVDA directors were negligent in not 
knowing and following the statutory requirements for merger 
found in sections 3-1-30 to -41, and that their breach of their 
duty of due care proximately resulted in more than $55,000,000 
in damages to CVDA. The relief requested under the second, 
third, and fourth causes of action was the same as that 
2. Although appellants contend that their first cause of 
action sets forth their individual claims for damages resulting 
from the "illegal merger," they have advanced no theory or 
legal authority to support any such individual claims for 
damages caused by the "dissipation and dilution" of CVDA's 
assets. 
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requested under the first cause of action. 
The fifth cause of action, captioned -Rescission,H was 
asserted against defendants Sam Soe 1-10 who "subsequent to the 
purported merger of CVDA into IMPA took title to property of 
CVDA from IMPA or have taken liens, mortgages, encumbrances or 
secured interests in the property of CVDA.H Appellants alleged 
that these transfers were null and void because IMPA had no 
authority to alienate the property of CVDA. They asked the 
court to restore the property to CVDA by ordering these 
defendants to -release, relinquish and reconvey any and all 
secured interest, liens or property received from IMPA." 
Several motions, including those for summary judgment and 
dismissal, were presented and argued to the trial court. The 
parties submitted -interchanges" of facts in which some facts 
were not fully agreed upon, but the material facts on which the 
trial court based its judgment were not disputed. Appellants 
moved for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that 
there was no valid merger and that the asset transfers were 
null and void. They also requested an injunction requiring the 
CVDA Board of Directors to resume control of CVDA's assets and 
personnel pending new elections. 
In response, defendants conceded that sections 3-1-30 to 
-41 had not been complied with before CVDA's assets were 
transferred to IMPA in exchange for IMPA's assumption of CVDA's 
obligations, but contended that the statute did not apply to 
combinations brought about by transfers of assets. They also 
filed a joint motion for summary judgment, alternatively based 
on the nonexclusivity of the statutory merger provisions, 
federal pre-emption, and the equitable doctrines of waiver and 
laches. 
The trial court agreed that, even if the statutory merger 
provisions applied to the combination of the four cooperatives 
in this case, the claims asserted by appellants individually 
and on behalf of CVDA for rescission of the merger and return 
of its assets were barred by laches. According to its 
memorandum decision, the trial court reached this conclusion 
because rights of the other cooperatives and third parties had 
intervened over the course of the gradual combination of the 
cooperatives. These parties had changed their positions in 
reliance on the apparent acquiescence by CVDA and its members 
during and after the combination process. Although the written 
decision shows the court's reasoning leading to judgment in 
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favor of respondents on appellants' first, second, and fifth 
causes of action, it does not reveal any basis for the court's 
apparent award of judgment on the two negligence claims against 
CVDA's attorney and directors.3 
' With this in mind, we first consider whether, on the 
undisputed facts before it, the trial court correctly 
determined that respondents were entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on appellants' first, second, and fifth causes of 
action for rescission because of laches. See, e.g., D&L Supply 
v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
For purposes of analysis, we will assume that the merger 
provisions found in sections 3-1-30 to -41 applied to the 
transaction by which CVDA's operations, assets, and liabilities 
were taken over by IMPA, even though respondents characterize 
the transaction as something other than a merger. We interpret 
sections 3-1-30 to -41 as creating individual rights in the 
members of an agricultural cooperative to enforce the mandated 
procedures and member vote requirements for accomplishing a 
merger.4 See Pitts v. Halifax Country Club. Inc. 19 Mass. 
3. Appellants are responsible for much of the confusion in the 
court's disposition of this case. Their causes of action and 
claims for relief were inadequately thought through and poorly 
pleaded. They seemed oblivious to the difference between a 
claim for damages and rescission as a form of equitable relief 
for a successul plaintiff, which may involve return to the 
status quo or the monetary equivalent of rescission if return 
to the status quo is impractical. See note 2, supra. 
Appellants also seemed unaware of the difference between their 
individual claims under the statutory merger provisions as CVDA 
members, for which they apparently sought certification of a 
class consisting of all members and equity holders, and the 
claims for injury to CVDA, which belonged only to CVDA and 
which could properly be brought as a derivative action, not as 
a class action. See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 
P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); sfifi also 12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5908 
(1984). MA class action and a derivative action rest upon 
fundamentally different principles of substantive law; to 
ignore those differences is not a minor procedural solecism." 
Richardson, 614 P.2d at 638. 
4. Besides enforcement of the merger provisions in the 
Agricultural Cooperative Association Act as they relate to 
requirements for prior member approval of a merger plan, the 
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App. 525, 476 N.E.2d 222 (1985); see also U-Beva Mines v. 
Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P.2d 867, 869 (1970) 
(interpreting statute requiring stockholder approval of sale of 
all corporate assets). That enforcement could take the form of 
an action in equity to enjoin any action to effectuate a 
planned merger or to set aside a merger not carried out with 
the approval required by the statute. 
In their first cause of action, appellants apparently were 
trying to assert their individual rights to enforce the voting 
provisions in the statute. Each other cause of action pleaded 
is derivative in nature, alleging injury to, or asserting a 
right purportedly belonging to CVDA itself. See Richardson v, 
Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980). 
The crux of appellants1 allegations is that, because of 
noncompliance with sections 3-1-30 to -41, the 
merger/consolidation transaction and all transfers of assets 
implementing it (including all legal documents utilized to 
transfer assets, assume liabilities, and proceed with the 
operation of the new cooperative, IMPA) are HillegalH and "null 
and void." Appellants err in their conclusion that the 
implementing acts performed by CVDA and the ultimate result, 
i.e., merger, are null and void. In Pitts, 476 N.E.2d at 227, 
a shareholder of the merged surviving corporation brought an 
action seeking to rescind the merger with two other 
corporations or to exercise statutory appraisal and payment 
rights for his shares. The court stated he was not on sound 
ground concerning the failure to comply with statutory merger 
requirements, because noncompliance -does not void the merger 
per se, but instead makes it voidable at the insistence of a 
shareholder who for any reason objects to the merger and is not 
by his actions estopped from voicing his objection thereto." 
We conclude that noncompliance with the merger provisions 
in sections 3-1-30 to -35 does not void the merger per se, but 
renders the merger voidable by objecting members. However, 
such members, like shareholders in corporations, are subject to 
equitable defenses when they seek to set aside an 
(footnote 4, continued) 
statute provides "dissenting members" a single remedy, i.e., 
payment by the surviving cooperative "of the fair value of the 
interest of such member," Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-40 (1988), which 
appellants did not seek. 
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accomplished merger because of noncompliance with sections 
3-1-30 et, seq. :5 
If a stockholder, with knowledge of 
wrongful acts on the part of the directors 
or a majority of the stockholders, stands 
by for an unreasonable time without taking 
any steps to set the acts aside or ^K 
otherwise interfere, and rights are 
acquired by others, his right to sue is 
barred by his laches, however clear his 
right to relief would have been if he had 
moved promptly. 
12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5874 (1984) (footnote omitted). In 
the more specific context of an action seeking relief from a 
consolidation or merger, Fletcher asserts that a stockholder 
must act with reasonable dispatch in view 
of all the circumstances of the case. 
Unexcused delay may bar his right to 
relief, particularly where the rights of 
innocent third persons have intervened. 
. . . [Stockholders may be barred by 
laches, in a proper case, from attacking 
the consolidation where they had either 
actual notice of the consolidation or 
notice of facts sufficient to put them on 
notice . . . . 
5. It is immaterial whether the 
transaction assailed is void or voidable. 
If the complainant has been guilty of 
laches, a court of equity will not look 
into the transaction at all. It requires 
conscience, good faith and reasonable 
diligence. These wanting, the court will 
remain passive and leave the parties where 
it finds them. 
Ruthrauff v. Silver Kino W. Mining & Milling Co., 95 Utah 279, 
80 P.2d 338, 347 (1938); S£fi Peck v. Monson. 652 P.2d 1325, 
1328 (Utah 1982) (Oaks, J., concurring) ("equity only aids the 
vigilant, and will deny relief to a litigant who sleeps on his 
rights"). 
* 
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15 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 7161 (1979) (footnotes omitted); 
accorfl Federal Home Loan Bank Board v. Elliott, 386 F.2d 42 
(9th Cir. 1967) (stockholder action to set aside merger barred 
by laches), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1967). As formulated 
by the Utah Supreme Court, the doctrine of laches is 
appropriately applied where there is (1) unreasonable delay by 
a plaintiff in seeking an available remedy, and (-2) prejudice 
to the defendant resulting from that delay. Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987). That prejudice could 
result from a transfer of title to property or the intervention 
of third party rights. Mawhinnev v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 
P.2d 769, 773 (1951). 
We now examine each element of laches in relation to the 
appellants. First, did they unreasonably delay in seeking 
rescission of the merger based on noncompliance with sections 
3-1-30 to -41? The appellants served as directors of CVDA at 
all material times. Each voted to enter into the letter of 
intent to merge knowing three existing cooperatives and one new 
cooperative would, as a result thereof, proceed faithfully 
through the merger process, relying on them and CVDA to do 
likewise. That letter of intent described what they wanted to 
accomplish (merger or consolidation) and how they would do it. 
Later, after the merger process had been underway for about 
eighteen months, the appellant directors voted to seek member 
approval of their prior plan, with one unidentified director 
dissenting. Each of the appellant directors, as a producer 
member, received notice of a special meeting of members to 
approve the merger/consolidation plan which they had adopted. 
Again, the notice stated what was to be accomplished and what 
the end result would be, i.e., merger/consolidation. The 
record does not verify whether each of the appellants attended 
the special meeting of members and, if so, how they voted as 
members. Even so, as directors they were charged with 
sufficient knowledge that the vote was 103 for and 43 against 
the plan and that the events and actions they had set in motion 
were rolling forward to the ultimate goal of merger or 
consolidation or combination that would include the transfer of 
CDVA's assets to IMPA, which took place in February 1986. 
The appellants, as members and directors, knew that a 
merger/consolidation had been initiated. They launched it in 
their Board meeting on June 27, 1984. They reaffirmed it in 
their Board meeting November 27, 1985, when they acted to call 
a special meeting of members to approve their plan. They knew 
that a large majority of the members present at the special 
890289-CA 12 
meeting on December 16, 1985, voted to approve a merger, 
consolidation or transfer of assets and liabilities. They knew 
or should have known that their officers were proceeding to 
effectuate the combination when appropriate documents were 
executed and delivered in February 1986. Nonetheless, they did 
not take any action to set aside the combination of the 
cooperatives into IMPA between December 16, 1985, and February 
1986. They failed to do anything until some time after the 
merger was complete on August 1, 1986. At the December 17, 
1986, CVDA Board meeting, the only affirmative action proposed 
was to seek indemnification from IMPA. The minutes are devoid 
of any proposal by appellants or anyone else to rescind or set 
aside the combination. Instead, appellants waited until six 
months after the merger/consolidation was complete to commence 
these proceedings challenging the validity of the merger. We 
conclude that their delay, under the circumstances, was 
unreasonable. 
Second, were the defendants prejudiced by the delay? 
The record conclusively shows that CVDA and IMPA changed 
their positions during the delay period and that myriad rights 
of numerous third parties intervened in that interim, CVDA 
transferred its assets in exchange for IMPA's assumption of its 
liabilities. The third parties affected include the other 
three consolidating cooperatives and their members, the members 
of IMPA and its creditors, customers and employees, all of whom 
substantially changed their legal status in reliance upon the 
actions taken by CVDA to participate in and accomplish the 
merger. They were not in a position to know whether CVDA was 
jumping through each and every procedural hoop within the 
confines of its cooperative organization. These persons had 
every right to believe that CVDA had complied with every legal 
requirement for completion of the merger and to rely upon that 
belief in changing their positions with respect to both CVDA 
and IMPA. The merger was in process for two years before 
completed and was a fully executed transaction for six months 
before appellants filed this suit. 
Although we do not condone any efforts to undermine the 
statutory rights given to members of agricultural cooperatives 
involved in mergers, we conclude, on the undisputed facts 
before the court, that the trial court correctly applied the 
doctrine of laches and granted judgment in favor of respondents 
on appellants' first cause of action. 
We next consider the other causes of action grounded on 
noncompliance with the statutory merger provisions. In both 
their second and fifth causes of action, appellants sought to 
derivatively assert the purported right of CVDA to rescind the 
merger and all attendant transfers of assets because of its 
failure to comply with the statutory merger provisions. 
Throughout this litigation, none of the parties has raised or 
briefed the preliminary issue of whether a cooperative's 
noncompliance with the merger provisions in the Agricultural 
Cooperative Association Act can even be asserted by the 
cooperative itself as a basis for rescinding its contract to 
merge or any transaction or document by which it transferred 
assets. If the statute cannot be used as a sword by the 
cooperative, the cooperative had no claims as set forth in the 
second and fifth causes of action that could be asserted either 
by the cooperative itself or by members on its behalf in a 
derivative action. In Sailer v. Land-Livestock-Recreation, 
Inc., 268 Or. 551, 522 P.2d 214 (1974), the court held that 
noncompliance with a similar statute requiring shareholder 
approval of a mortgage of substantially all of a corporation's 
assets was assertable only by shareholders. See Pitts, 476 
N.E.2d at 427 (noncompliance "will not normally be a ground for 
invalidation at the instance of others"). Interpreting a 
similar Utah statute requiring shareholder approval of sales of 
all corporate assets, the Utah Supreme Court first seemed to 
say that the statute, was not assertable at all by the 
corporation itself to void a lease with purchase option, but 
then backed off and appeared to pin the result on laches or 
estoppel by referring to the lapse of time the corporation had 
waited to seek avoidance of the lease, all the while accepting 
lease payments. U-Beva Mines. 471 P.2d at 869. 
Because this important question was not raised or argued, 
we decline to resolve it here. Assuming that CVDA could assert 
its own noncompliance with the statutory merger provisions as a 
basis for setting aside its merger into IMPA and voiding all 
legal documents transferring assets to IMPA, the derivative 
claims seeking rescission set forth in appellants' second and 
fifth causes of action are, nonetheless, barred by laches for 
the same reasons already discussed. See Becker v. Becker, 66 
Wis. 731, 225 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1975). 
Finally, we address the trial court's disposition of 
appellants' third and fourth causes of action asserting 
negligence claims. The court considered several pending 
motions simultaneously and disposed of them in a brief and 
incomplete memorandum decision. See text at note 3, supra. It 
890289-CA 14 
is impossible for us to divine whether the court intended (a) 
to actually grant judgment on the third and fourth causes of 
action based on a conclusion that there could be no such 
negligence, e.g., because the merger provisions in sections 
3-1-30 to -41 did not apply to the combination of cooperatives 
in this case; or (b) to dismiss the two causes of action based 
on negligence without prejudice for other reasons having to do 
with their derivative nature. For example, perhaps the court 
determined that, on the facts before it, appellants had not 
adequately demonstrated efforts to obtain the desired action 
from the CVDA directors or members or shown adequate reasons 
for the failure to make such efforts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
23.1. Or perhaps the trial court determined that the 
appellants would not fairly and adequate represent the 
interests of similarly situated members in enforcing any rights 
CVDA might have against its attorney and directors arising out 
of their alleged negligence. See ajl. 
Because we are unable to determine the trial court's basis 
for entering judgment in favor of respondents on the two 
derivative negligence claims, we reverse the trial court's 
order of July 23, 1987, insofar as it relates to appellants' 
third and fourth causes of action and remand for further 
proceedings. However, insofar as the order dismisses 
appellants' first, second, and fifth causes of action and 
awards judgment to respondents, it is affirmed. The parties 
are to bear their own costs on appeal. 
S7 s* 
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Norman H. Jacksorf; Judge iff  
I CONCUR: 
n r, , R . 
F Robert Bullock, Judge 
ORME, J. (concurring): 
I concur in the court's exhaustive opinion disposing of 
this appeal. I question, however, our decision not to publish 
the opinion. 
Although I do not quite agree that every appellate decision 
more extensive than an order merits publication, Q£.. Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), I do believe that, absent unusual circumstances, 
if an appeal merits a full-blown opinion, the opinion should be 
published. Conversely, publication may properly be dispensed 
with where a short, summary opinion or a memorandum decision, 
employing only settled principles of law, is an adequate 
treatment of a comparatively simple appeal. 
The instant appeal is factually complex and poses difficult 
legal issues. Accordingly, the court's opinion sets forth the 
facts in detail and analyzes the key issues carefully. It 
treats Utah statutory provisions which have not been considered 
in prior appellate decisions. Its discussion of laches in the 
context of corporate merger is insightful and would prove 
useful as precedential guidance to practitioners and trial 
courts confronting similar cases. Thus, the opinion merits 
publication. 
This court's practice has been to defer completely to the 
main opinion's author on the question of whether or not a 
particular disposition is published. This case demonstrates 
the difficulty with that custom. If I had authored the 
opinion, it would be published. Because another judge has 
authored it, it will not be. This strikes me as an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs, especially since a decision 
not to publish is tantamount to depriving an opinion of any 
precedential value. See Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
§ 4-508 (effective January 15, 1990). The court should 
reassess its practice in this regard. 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENE BRICE, et al 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Argicultural 
Cooperative, et al 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 25514 
There have been various motions for partial summary judgment, 
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions to have 
the Court determine whether a class action can be brought, and 
other motions to strike. The Court will address all of these 
motions collectively rather than individually. 
As to the class action motion, the Court holds that the class 
action is not appropriate for reasons that three different classes, 
equity holders, producers, directors, may have different interests, 
and for other reasons that will be better understood as set forth 
in the body of this memorandum decision. 
Plaintiffs are seeking recession of the action taken by the 
defendants of what is termed by the plaintiffs a merger under Section 
^ 1 - 3 1 , U.C.A. They are also seeking restitution and a separate 
i5 qause of action for money damages. The reason they seek this relief 
r^ co . , 
en - l 
m 2 
— «-u, 
«v 
S co . 
s that the defendants failed to affect a valid merger by reason of 
kilure to comply with statutory procedures on mergers. The Court 
m« xv~±-Z ^.^ -.— J <?.<.,«,«»«-%«-.•. ^.^* G^^-v^A U^ -»» 
Brice v. Cache Valley Dairy Assn. 
Civil No. 25514 
June 26, 1987 
Page Two 
plan of merger (consolidation) but there is no description of 
a sale of assets as an alternative in the notice. The Court 
holds that the Notice was defective if it was contemplated there 
was to be a merger or consolidation. And, the Court in fact, 
holds that this never occurred. The Court, however, holds that 
a merger or consolidation is not an exclusive alternative to a 
change or affecting a consolidation by exchange of assets. 
The Court holds that first there can be no recession as there 
are many other entities, people involved, that have so changed 
their position in reliance upon the transfer of assets that it 
would be inequitable for the Court to consider the remedies of 
recession and restitution. But, more importantly, the Court 
finds that there was no merger or consolidation, but there was 
a transfer of assets by CVD to IMPA for consolidation putting 
members or producers in CVD in a position where they may have a 
cause of action for monetary damage by reason of the elimination of 
all of the assets of CVD which destroys the value of their equity 
rights. The Court makes no holdings in this regard since there 
is no indications of a request for such damages in the complaint 
by the plaintiffs by reason of a sale of the assets, the plaintiffs 
relying solely for relief by reason of an invalid merger. 
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Brice v. Cache Va l l ey Diary Assn. 
C i v i l No. 25514 
June 26, 1987 
Page Three 
There f o r e , the Court d i s m i s s e s p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint 
a g a i n s t a l l defendants wi thout p r e j u d i c e t o amend the complaint 
for any p o s s i b l e monetary damages by reason of the d e s t r u c t i o n of 
the p l a i n t i f f s e q u i t y in CVD as a r e s u l t of t r a n s f e r of a s s e t s . 
Counsel for defendants t o prepare the appropr ia te order . 
Dated t h i s 29th day of June, 19 87. 
BY THE COURT: 
i 
' // , 
VeNoy^ C h r i s t b f f e r s e h 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
Roger P, Cjn^fbettSBn..,- 5A]\Clark Learning Bldg. - 175 So. West Temple - SLC, Utah 84101 
M.David E/kez'sley^ - 41$, BesW Bldg. - SLC, Utah 84111 
J. Anthony Eyre -*" City Centr'4 I, No. 330 - 175 East 4th South - SLC, Utah 84111 
R7 Bre'ntTStephens'.-.JLQ.i. BQXILSDOO - SLC, Utah 84145 
N. George Jteines -. Iflfl Ua\ rJsAa.TSuAte 200 - Logan, Utah 84321 
\l.r» 29thd*y of.... Juna /, 19--*7 
/ifH 3. ALLEN, C!.rk , ,„ ' 
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ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN 
ROGER FAIRBANKS 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
JAMES C. JENKINS 
JENKINS, MCKEAN & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-4107 
Attorneys for IMPA 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
GENE BRICE, WILLIS HALL, 
JOSEPH R. MAY, DOUGLAS QUAYLE, 
THEDFORD ROPER, J. ROLFE 
TUDDENHAM and GORDON ZILLES, 
on behalf of themselves, for ORDER 
the benefit of Cache Valley 
Dairy Association and for all 
members and/or Holders 
Certificates of Interest in 
Cache Valley Dairy Association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. Civil No. 25514 
CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Agricultural Cooperative; 
INTERMOUNTAIN MILK PRODUCERS 
ASSOCIATION; a Utah Agricultural 
Cooperative; VERNON BANKHEAD; 
RANDALL BRADSHAW; DON C. NYE; 
FRANK P. OLSEN; WILFORD B. MEEK; 
LATHAIR PETERSON; RULON KING; 
LARRY PITCHER; LYNN MICKEL; 
ROBERT HAWORTH; JEFF HYDE; EVAN 
SKINNER; ROBERT JACKSON; and 
WILLIAM LINDLEY; RANDON WILSON; 
JOHN DOES 1-30; SAN SOES 1-10, 
Defendants. !<• I' I. '"I 
2 . 1337 
n ^ ,„nn alHS.AJlBl, Clerk ^86 
Various motions for partial summary judgment, motions to 
dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions to have the Court 
determine whether a class action can be brought, motions to 
strike and other matters are currently pending before the Court. 
The Court, in this order, addresses these motions collectively, 
rather than individually. 
The Court heard the arguments of counsel, reviewed the 
record in this case and issued a memorandum decision. Based 
thereon, and for the reasons stated therein, now, therefore, it 
is hereby Ordered that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Request for Class Certification be, and 
hereby is denied; 
2. Plaintiffs' claims for rescission and restitution be, 
and hereby are dismissed; 
3. Plaintiffs' claims, as pleaded in this case, be and 
hereby are dismissed as to all Defendants without prejudice. 
However, such dismissal is without prejudice to 
Plaintiffs' right to amend the complaint to assert such claims as 
Plaintiffs may have for monetary damages, to the extent 
Plaintiffs may have sustained such damages, for the destruction 
or diminution, if any, of the value of Plaintiffs' equity 
interests, as a result of a wrongful transfer of CVDA's assets to 
IMPA and the transfer of such equity interests from CVDA to IMPA. 
By granting leave to Plaintiffs to assert such claims, the Court 
makes no determination as to whether the transfer of assets was 
wrongful and makes no determination as to the merit, if any, of 
such claims, but reserves such determinations for future 
nnn. (]Pl7 ,.'i :{[){]/[ 587 
consideration. 
DATED this ": 7- day of July, 1987, 
BY THE COURT 
, / 
VeNoy Christoffersen 
District Court Judge 
